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By: [redacted] NARS Date: 11/1/02

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

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Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of United States policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other Hemisphere states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

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7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;
8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;
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- and
10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

- A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U. S. Government will be prepared to increase the political economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further

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actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

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2. With respect to the actions listed below, the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners should first be ascertained. If these actions were taken before the conclusion of the negotiations they could jeopardize the release of the Americans.
3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:
4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:
 - a. Close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;
 - b. Close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the Bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;
 - c. Prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

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- d. Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

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B. Contingency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba.

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